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British Confederation Plans concerning Central and Eastern Europe (1939–1945)

In my present essay I am going to elaborate on the different integration-schemes of Central and Eastern Europe produced in Great Britain during the Second World War. There were certainly numerous other attempts to outline the possible ways of regional or sub-regional collaboration, which already emerged during the 19th century (and even earlier): Pan-Germanism embodied in its concepts of *Mitteuropa*, Pan-Slavism (the desire of the liberation and unification of the Slav peoples) and the modernisation of the Habsburg Empire on a federative basis. Nevertheless, none of these once envisioned schemes could ever be fully materialised, and from 1919–1920 onwards the nation state became the solely legitimate political formation, which strengthened the forces of separation in the region (to be discussed in detail).

The outbreak of the Second World War saw a revival of confederative thought, the political centre of which became London. The present essay aims at presenting the British ideas as a concrete great-power initiative to create a means of political, economic and thus cultural co-operation in a fragmented Central and Eastern Europe.


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Terminological Insight: Which Europe?

The territory that the present essay embraces, lying between Germany and Russia or the Baltic and Adriatic seas, is certainly not a clear-cut geographic unit. I am well aware of the fact that the use of the notions 'Central' and 'Eastern Europe' for the above region is highly subjective, and they overlap with East-Central and Southeast Europe etc., which are again not easily definable either. Moreover, if one takes the effort to study the numerous definitions and arguments, one might draw the lesson that the terminological chaos still rules the international scene. Or rather, the usage of the term mostly depends on the users' nationality and their preference for their own nation.

Having a look at the relevant primary sources of the late thirties and forties one faces the same terminological anomaly as relates to the various terms and definitions applied for the region: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, the 'Middle Zone' or 'the Zone of Small nations' and even 'no man's land between Germany and Russia', etc. However, all documents emphasise that the region of Central and Eastern Europe has been determined by the continuous presence of certain multiethnic powers (up to 1918 Austria, the Ottoman Empire and the tsarist Russia). Hungary, Bohemia and Poland indeed lost their sovereignty at 1526, 1620 and 1795 the latest, let alone the other nations, which gained independence much later (from 1878).

Out of the three great powers in Central and Eastern Europe Austria (from 1867 onwards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) is especially a subject of great importance owing to the strategic position she occupied in the region. During her fifty-one years of existence the Monarchy, composed of fifteen nationalities, left behind common institutional mechanisms, cultural habits and mental attitudes. From the foreign political point of view it had been viewed in Britain as 'the pivot of the balance of power' since time immemorial, and the Compromise (1867) - together with the Italian and German unifications (1871) - indeed introduced a long period of stability. Austria-Hungary was considered to be the stronghold against the Russian expansion, the Pan-Slav movements and the rapidly increasing power of the Bismarckian Germany. It was nevertheless evident that this triple mission could only be fulfilled by an internally stable Monarchy. By the end of the 19th century however, modern nationalism based on the coexistence of people of common origin and language gained ground against dynastic or historic claims, holding the nation state to be the ideal and the only legitimate political formation.



1919: Milestone with Deficiencies

By 1918 a completely new situation arose in Europe: not only was German militarism crushed, but all three multiethnic powers were demolished as well, leaving a vacuum in the region. The writer of the present essay believes that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, though hastened by the Great War, was primarily an organic process. It was caused by the inelasticity of the Compromise and the fact that the Monarchy had not offered, as it could not offer, its peoples a solution of the national question.

The settlement of 1919 therefore in principle disregarded any 'worn out'

dynastic or historic claims, basing itself solely on the ethnic principle. Thus under the new system a larger number of peoples of Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed more complete national liberty than ever before. Unfortunately, as the impossibility of forming pure national states in an area where the peoples were so mixed became evident, the peacemakers found themselves obliged to make concessions to strategic and economic, at occasions even to historical considerations against the principle of nationality and free national self-determination.

Moreover, where one claim had to be set against another the benefit of doubt was almost always given to the same side. The result was that national minorities amounted to one-third of the total population of Czechoslovakia, nearly as high a proportion of that of Poland, one quarter of that in Rumania, while the Ruthenes', Slovaks', Croats', Montenegrins' and Macedonian Slavs' national allegiance was doubtful, and German Austria was refused the right to join Germany.

Whenever the idea of 'Central Europe' has come up in history, it was connected to the wish of creating a new European order¹. What the Versailles Settlement brought about in Central Europe on the other hand, was not according to MASARYK's prophecies a 'bulwark against German aggression', promoting enduring peace and political stability. Ethnically motivated political and territorial rivalry proceeded to take precedence over economic rationality and security. The only difference was that having fulfilled their national aspirations, the previously irredentist nationalities - the Greek, the Polish, the Rumanian and the Serb - strove to maintain the status quo, while German and Hungarian nationalism was suffused with the ethos of irredentism and revisionism.

The inter-war ethnic conflicts were further aggravated by two serious shortcomings of the Minority Treaties. Firstly the ethnic minorities were not given corporate existence, which enabled individuals only to turn to the League for legal redress opposing them against their own governments. Secondly, the Settlement left the execution of the treaties in the hands of the successor states that could easily disregard the Council's recommendations as direct interference with their home affairs.

In the mid 1930s it became increasingly clear that the Central and Eastern Europe of robust national rivalries together with the growing impotence of the League of Nations had not been able to serve as an impediment to aggressive, primarily German and possibly Soviet aspirations. The prevalence of isolationist tendencies in the inter-war era is well illustrated

¹For details on the evolution of the idea of Central Europe see László PÉTER's excellent article *Central Europe and its Reading into the Past*. *European Review of History* 1999/1. 102. Also consult Peter BUGGE, *The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs. Stredni Evropa*. *European Review of History* 1999/2.

by the fact that among the numerous attempts to establish multilateral alliances not a single one [...] ever materialised, apart from the Little Entente, [...] which conveyed a clear defensive, rather than a co-operative message.

The outbreak of the Second World War, namely the German attack of Poland in September 1939, was an important step towards the creation of a new European order; that is, Pax Germanica based on the political and economic subjugation of Central and Eastern Europe above all. The events showed clearly that one great power's complete and monopolistic control of the area threatens the safety of the world. Having realised that the independence and stability of Central and Eastern Europe is a vital interest, Great Britain (and the United States as well) devoted increasing attention to the reorganisation of the area in order to increase the collaboration of states in the region.

Interwar Central and Eastern Europe in British Perspective

On the eve of the war the British government organised the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) so as to prepare a more scientific settlement in Central and Eastern Europe. This semi-official informative body of Foreign Office (later to be called its Research Department [RD]) was composed of specialists and academics from the Royal Institute of International Affairs led by Arnold TOYNBEE and based at Balliol College, Oxford. Robert William SETON-WATSON (1879-1951, expert on Central and Eastern European history, one of the staunchest advocates of nation states and of status quo after 1919) was soon nominated head of South-Eastern European Section. Carlisle Aymler MACARTNEY (1895-1978, an expert on Hungary, insisted on the revision of the Versailles Settlement based on the sole application of the ethnic principle) became his main colleague.

While analysing the ethnic, economic, and political conditions of the Danube Basin, the experts unanimously stated that the creation of national states had not fulfilled the expectations. As revealed from a memorandum² completed in 1941, the collapse of the Versailles Settlement was attributed to the following factors:

External: namely the lack of political and economic collaboration between the small states due to irredentism, minority problems, tariff barriers and the pressure of the Great Depression (1929-32), lack of interest shown by Western Great Powers (British and US isolationist tendencies and the lip-service policy of France) and the German and Italian support of Magyar and Bulgarian revisionism.

² *The Causes of the Collapse of the East European States*. In R. W. Seton-Watson's papers. Archives of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. SEW/12/3/3.

Internal: the peasant problem (lack of radical land reform in Hungary and Poland), the industrial labour problem (a discontented and politically uneducated mass of workers at the mercy of radical demagogy), the problem of the bourgeoisie (a semi-educated, nepotistic, irresponsible and socially insensitive ruling class), the false educational system (the prevalence of non-objective and chauvinistic spirit), false political system (only pseudo-democratic systems, dishonest officials and bureaucracy), the Jewish Question (anti-Semitism systematically exploited by the governments), difference in cultural level within the states and military unpreparedness.

From 1939 onwards, in order to avoid the recurrence of the above-mentioned internal and external problems in the region, several proposals were submitted to the Foreign Office concerning the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. They were all based on the assumption that sanctions against the militarist and aggressive Germany imposed after the war are not enough in themselves to guarantee long-lasting peace in Europe. In the following pages three British memoranda of the successive years 1941, 1942 and 1943 are to be discussed in detail in order to present the (d)evolution of the British idea of a confederation in the region.

The 1941-Memorandum

One of the 'simplest' solutions considered in a memorandum titled *The Reconstruction Of Eastern Europe II. International Relations*³ from 1941 was the division of the states in the region into two camps: the victorious and the vanquished, that is those who were the victims of the German aggression and those who assisted it. The former would have a privileged position, the latter on the other hand would occupy a position of inferiority, completely disarmed and burdened with heavy reparations. This system – argue the authors – would be 'morally' more just than treating all countries equally, and would not require any intellectual effort. On the other hand, - as the memorandum states – the post-1918 settlement was de facto based on the victor-versus-vanquished principle and the result is well known. Therefore some more imaginative kind of a solution must be sought.

Further on the 1941-memorandum goes on to discuss the nature of the possible federal solutions which are supposed to combine cultural and administrative independence of the nations concerned with close economic co-operation and common defence. The proposed federation would have a central government with common affairs (foreign policy, defence and trade), administration would be conducted in the language of the inhabitants, while in mixed areas several languages would be equally recognised. Under such federal system - argues the author - internal fron-

³SEW/12/3/3.

tiers would lose their importance, but the external frontiers of each federal unit must be determined by cultural/historical, geopolitical/economic and ethnical considerations. Nevertheless, as these factors are in conflict with each other, there are three possible proposals according to which consideration dominates over the others.

According to the cultural/historical perspective the document regards Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Western Poland, Hungary, Transylvania (sic), Vojvodina (sic) and Croatia as Central European countries owing to the Catholic influence and the dominance of the Habsburg Empire. Serbia, Bulgaria, rural Greece, the Old Kingdom of Romania, Albania and Eastern Poland, all having been ruled by Russians or Turks and influenced by Byzantine or Eastern traditions, on the other hand are ranked as Balkan, or Eastern European countries. According to the author the major difficulty of the implementation of the cultural/historical division is that it cuts right across the post-war States of Rumania, Poland and Yugoslavia, thus implies the complete revision of the Versailles Settlement. It is interesting to note that this division is very similar to Samuel HUNTINGTON's theory elaborated half a century later in his 'The Clash of Civilisations' (1993), which interprets the religious divide as a fundamental cultural line between 'Western' and a separate 'Slavic-Orthodox' civilisation.

In contrast to the above-discussed line, the geopolitical/economic division necessitates the creation of three different regions in Central and Eastern Europe. The Baltic region determined by the Baltic Sea and the mountain chains of the Carpathians would consist of Poland and the Baltic States the inclusion of which is a new element in the federative scheme. The Danube region would be composed of Hungary, Slovakia, Vojvodina, Rumania and Eastern Croatia [...]. The third, namely the Balkan region, situated between the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas would be comprised of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and the European part of Turkey. The memorandum leaves the future of Bohemia-Moravia and Croatia undecided as both regions are situated between two main geopolitical divisions: the former between the Baltic and the Danubian, the latter between the Danubian and the Balkan federations. From the above drafted scheme it is clear that this division – in contrast to the cultural/historical line - would not blow up the Versailles Settlement, as in case Bohemia-Moravia was included in the Danube region, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia would be the only necessary precondition.

Finally the third dividing line elaborated on in the memorandum according to ethnographical connections if applied, would result in the following groups: the region inhabited by the Western Slav peoples (ie. Czechs,

Slovaks and Poles), the South Slav region (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians, though a subdivision according to religion is possible) and the third branch of non-Slavic peoples, i.e. the Magyars and Rumanians.

Having elaborated on all three possible divisions the document goes on to discuss the doubtful areas in Central and Eastern Europe whose cultural, geopolitical and national characteristics do not point in the same direction. In case of Bohemia-Moravia though theoretically possible, the author disregards its inclusion in a Danubian Federation due to 'the violent hatred' of the Czechs for all that is German and their antipathy towards the Magyars. Similarly, in spite of the fact that the Slovaks are geographically strongly connected with Hungary, i.e. the Danubian states, owing to their 'profound hatred' for the Magyars and vice versa, should rather join the Baltic Confederation as part of the reunited Czechoslovakia (and together with Poland).

Concerning Yugoslavia the memorandum expresses the same pro status quo ante bellum opinion very explicitly, though placing it into a Balkan federation with Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. As a matter of fact the restoration of the pre-war Southern Slav State contradicts all three already discussed division lines, let alone the 'frightful wealth of hatred' stored up on Croat and Serb side. The author on the other hand, holds the romantic view that 'Serbs and Croats have got to live together, because there is no other real possibility of Croatia'.

The above ignorance of self-determination is even more visible in case of Slovenia. No matter that the adhesion of the region to Serbia is against the discussed cultural and the economic considerations, the author adds in a condescending manner that the Slovenes 'are too small a nation to have a state of their own'.

Rumania is discussed in the memorandum as probably the most problematic country in Eastern Europe. Though the Old Kingdom culturally belongs to the Balkan/Eastern Europe section, geographically it is regarded to be more a part of the Danubian region, ethnically on the other hand the Rumanian people belongs to none of their neighbours. Let alone Transylvania, which with its mixed population (3 million Rumanians, 1.5 million Magyars and 400 thousand Germans) is a constant threat to stability. The author casts aside both the Magyar and Rumanian 'chauvinists' plans concerning the future of Transylvania, i.e. her incorporation into Hungary together with 3 million Rumanians, or the status quo ante plus the transfer of the Hungarian minority.

Having taken the ardent nationalism and the 'hatred of the two ruling classes' into account, the author still remains convinced that the only solu-

tion of the Rumanian-Magyar and the Transylvanian problem is that all three non-Slavic areas should join one confederation, the latter as an autonomous unit. Nevertheless it seems to be probable that this solution could not be imposed but for the Allied forces, that, having occupied both countries, would be able to defend the peoples from 'unscrupulous political demagogues'.

Thus having examined the chief combinations the writer favours the creation of the following three federations: a Baltic federation (Poland with frontier rectifications in favour of Russia, Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia, i.e. Czechoslovakia), a Danubian federation (Hungary, Rumania, the autonomous Transylvania plus an autonomous Ruthenia) and a Balkan federation (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, ie. Yugoslavia together with Bulgaria, Greece and Albania).

The FRPS-Memorandum (1942)

At the beginning of 1942 two interstate alliances were concluded by statesmen living in exile in London. The Polish-Czech and Greek-Yugoslav agreements that contained the basic principles necessary for future co-operation soon became the cores of further British federation-proposals. In August 1942, as a result of lengthy research a comprehensive study was completed by the FRPS-staff titled *Confederations in Eastern Europe*.

The memorandum insisted on the formation of two initial confederations in Central and Eastern Europe with a view of their possible future convergence. The Northern Confederacy would be composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia (with possible autonomy for the Slovaks), Hungary and perhaps Austria (which would strengthen the union economically, but would increase the German element). The Southern or Balkan Confederacy would have consisted of Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania and Bulgaria.

Further on in the document there is a discussion of the expected territorial problems, minority issues, the outside relations of the planned confederations and – as a new element – already 'how best in any combination to meet [...] the Soviet government[']s demand] in order to guarantee their strategic security and their economic and political interests'⁴.

⁴ Public Record Office, London. Foreign Office Documents (PRO FO)/371/31500.

⁵ On MACARTNEY's life's work see Hugh SETON-WATSON's *Carlisle Aymler Macartney 1895-1978, The Proceedings of the British Academy*. London, 1981.

⁶ PRO FO 371/34400.

The MACARTNEY-memorandum (1943)

One of the most prolific members of the FRPS was C. A. MACARTNEY⁵ with his 143 major studies covering all aspects of foreign and internal politics of Central and Eastern European countries. His probably most significant wartime memorandum is a long study written in September 1943, titled *The Settlement of Eastern Europe*⁶. According to the author four types of future are plausible concerning Central and Eastern Europe: permanent German control, permanent Russian control 'in [which] case Britain would ex hypothesi be reduced to the role of a spectator', or an independent Eastern Europe (a term invented and used by MACARTNEY) organised either on a selective or a comprehensive basis.

MACARTNEY personally believed that the comprehensive solution, namely the creation of solidarity based on the common interests of the Central and Eastern European peoples, would best satisfy the region. In terms of practical politics it meant the creation of nation states by an equal application of the ethnic principle for both the victors and the vanquished, which is a precondition of the establishment of multinational organisations, i.e. federations. In MACARTNEY'S OWN words: "Those who say that political appeasement will follow in the course of time, on the basis of a thoroughly unequal selective settlement, are either fools (the usual case when they are Britons) or hypocrites (if Central Europeans)".

MACARTNEY'S paper was well received by other regional specialists, one of whom soberly remarked: "It is clear that any attempt on our part to impose a solution in face of Soviet opposition would be fruitless. The Soviet Government has made it pretty clear that they have no intention of agreeing to anything approximating to what Mr. MACARTNEY describes as the 'comprehensive' settlement".

The Death-Agony of the British Idea of Confederation and After

As the war proceeded, it gradually became evident that the settlement of Central and Eastern Europe depended on [...] which power would dominate the region after France and Germany. As in November 1943 at the Conference of Teheran the British and the Americans cast away the Balkans Debarcation under Soviet pressure, practically, they yielded to the sovietization of the region. A year later, the infamous 'percentage agreement' between CHURCHILL and STALIN was in fact the British acknowledgement of Soviet dominance in Central and Eastern Europe.

Therefore, by the end of the war not only the aggressive biological-racial notion of Pax Germanica was crushed, but the Foreign Office was also squeezed out of the reorganisation of the region. Thus all the British plans

of confederations based on independence, equality and democracy were long relegated to a pipe-dream status.

What came instead was the establishment of the Soviet bloc, a forty-year long inorganic period in the history of Central Europe, though a certain degree of political and even cultural integration is often attributed to it. On the other hand even this level of integration can be doubted: firstly, it was glued together by the continuous presence of the Red Army. Secondly, as soon as the Soviet bloc collapsed – apart from a short period of euphoria – the old conflicts, which owing to Bolshevik internationalism had had to be ignored and buried, came into the limelight again.

In the course of history Central and Eastern Europe has always been a challenging area of co-operation schemes, nevertheless willingness to work together on a long-term basis has always been blocked either by great powers or the nations themselves. The common aspiration of practically all the new democracies between Russia and Germany to soon become full members of the European Union - certainly together with the abandonment of both irredentism and the idea of homogeneous nation-states – seems to be the only possible means of reconciliation and co-operation which hopefully all the Central and Eastern Europeans are looking forward to.

Suggested Reading

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BERETZKY Ágnes: A Brit Nemzetközösség tervei Közép- és Kelet-Európát illetően (1939-1945)



E tanulmány azokat a különböző integrációs modelleket adja közre, amelyeket Nagy-Britannia dolgozott ki a második világháború során. A tervek létrejöttének legfőbb okai az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiának mint az orosz és német terjeszkedés ellenerődjének elvesztése, és a régió újonnan alakult nemzetállamaiban érvényesülő elszigetelődési folyamatok. 1939-ben, amikor Közép- és Kelet-Európa függetlensége és stabilitása még fontosabbá vált, a brit kormányzat főállította a Foreign Research and Press Service (Külgügyi Kutató- és Sajtószolgálat) nevű intézetet, hogy az készítse elő szakmai alapon az új közép- és kelet-európai berendezkedést. A különféle megközelítésekből (kulturális-történelmi, geopolitikai-gazdasági, etnikai szempontok szerint) számos lehetséges szövetségi modell született, amelyekből végül három, a balti, a dunai, és a balkáni föderáció elképzelése bontakozott ki. A cseh-lengyel és a görög-jugoszláv államközi szövetségek létrejöttét követően a főnti indítványt két egységre szűkítették: az északi és a déli konföderációra. Mindezen tervek azonban álmok maradtak csupán, hiszen jött Teherán (1943), illetve CHURCHILL és SZTÁLIN megegyezése a térség fősztásáról. Másfelől, a Szovjetunónak mint főszereplőnek a belépése a közép- és kelet-európai színtérre, bezitósította a brit tervek megvalósításának kudarcát.

BERETZKY Ágnes: Plany Brytyjskiej Konfederacji dotyczące Środkowej i Wschodniej Europy (1939–1945)



Esej przedstawia różnorodne schematy integracji proponowane przez Wielką Brytanię podczas Drugiej Wojny Światowej. Powody, dla których te plany zaistniały, wynikały z upadku Imperium Austro-Węgierskiego jako przeciwwagi dla ekspansji Niemiec i Rosji oraz z tendencji separatystycznych, które dominowały w nowoutworzonych państwach narodowych regionu. W 1939, kiedy niezależna i stabilna Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia stawała się coraz ważniejsza, brytyjski rząd zorganizował Badania Zagraniczne i Serwis Prasowy, żeby przygotować bardziej naukowy układ w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Pojawiło się kilka możliwych modeli federacji, każdy wynikający z innego odczucia (kulturowo-historycznego, geopolityczno-ekonomicznego, etnicznego), a skutkujący w trzech federacjach – bałtyckiej, dunajskiej oraz bałkańskiej. Po przejściowych czesko-polskim i grecko-jugosłowiańskim aliansach, powyższe propozycje ograniczono do dwóch jednostek: Północnej i Południowej Konfederacji. Wszystkie te plany przeszły w sferę marzeń w 1943 roku wraz z Teheranem i porozumieniem CHURCHILLA i STALINA. Z drugiej strony wejście Związku Radzieckiego jako głównego aktora na scenę Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej poprzedziło porażkę wprowadzenia wszystkich brytyjskich planów.



BERETZKY Ágnes: Britské plány konfederácií v Strednej a Východnej Európe (1939-1945)

Článok oboznamuje čitateľa s rôznymi integračnými schémami, ktoré Veľká Británia vypracovala v čase Druhej svetovej vojny. Dôvody, kvôli ktorým tieto plány vznikli, súviseli s rozpadom Rakúsko-uhorskej monarchie, ktorá predstavovala hrádzu proti ruskému a nemeckému expanzionizmu, ako aj s izolacionistickými tendenciami, ktoré zohrávali dôležitú úlohu pri formácii vzťahov medzi novovytvorenými národnými štátmi v regióne. V roku 1939, keď sa nezávislá a silná Stredná a Východná Európa stala ešte dôležitejšou, vytvorila britská vláda Zahraničnú výskumnú a tlačovú službu, ktorej úlohou bolo pripraviť vedecky podložené usporiadanie Strednej a Východnej Európy. Pri aplikácii rôznych kritérií (kultúrno-historické, geopoliticko-ekonomické, etnické) vznikli viaceré možné modely federácie, pričom výsledný model obsahoval tri federácie – pobaltskú, podunajskú a balkánsku. Po medzištátnej poľsko-československej a grécko-juhoslovanskej aliancii, bol horeuvedený návrh obmedzený na dva celky: Severnú a Južnú konfederáciu. Všetky tieto plány sa stali iluzórnymi po teheránskych rokovaníach v roku 1943 a percentuálnej dohode medzi CHURCHILLOM a STALINOM. Na druhej strane však rast sovietskej moci v Strednej a Východnej Európe zatienil pravdepodobné zlyhanie britských plánov v prípade uplatnenia.



BERETZKY Ágnes: Pläne der britischen Konföderation im Bezug auf Zentral- und Osteuropa (1939–1945)

Diese Abhandlung beschäftigt sich mit den unterschiedlichen Integrationspläne Grossbritanniens während des zweiten Weltkriegs. Der Grund für die Entwicklung dieser Pläne liegt darin, dass nach dem Ende der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie der Schutzwall vor den russischen und deutschen Expansionsplänen zusammengebrochen war, hinzukommen isolationistische Tendenzen in den neu gegründeten Staaten. 1939, als ein unabhängiges und stabiles Zentral- und Osteuropa immer wichtiger wurde, rief die britische Regierung den Ausländischer Wissenschafts- und Pressedienst ins Leben um sich mehr auf der wissenschaftlichen Ebene in Zentral- und Osteuropa festzusetzen. Es gab mehrere Bündnismodelle jedes mit einem anderen Ausgangspunkt (kulturhistorisch, geopolitisch-ökonomisch, ethnisch). Daraus entstanden drei Bündnisgebiete – das Baltikum, das Donaugebiet und der Balkan. Nach den Tschechisch-Polnischen und Griechisch-Jugoslawischen Allianzen wurde der frühere Vorschlag so umgewandelt, dass es nur zwei Teile gab, ein nördliches und ein südliches Bündnis. Diese Pläne wurden nach der Konferenz von Teheran und CHURCHILLS und STALINS Prozentabkommen verworfen. Andererseits gab es hier schon einmal einen Vorgeschmack auf die zukünftige Rolle der Sowjetunion auf der europäischen Bühne und das damit verbundene Scheitern der britischen Pläne.