

embodied in the Holy Roman Empire, spiced with some Germanic temperament) and from exclusivism, as well as from a certain form of functional polytheism, to a new or wider or macro-ecumenism of religions.⁶¹

We could contrast sharply the Christian theology of religion, which is conceptual, doctrinal and antagonistic, with the Christian theology of religions, which is historical, social and political, as well as empathetic.⁶² Accordingly, Israel SELVANAYAGAM greets the developments that the emphasis of the Christian theology of dialogue has shifted mainline Christian theology from Christocentric universalism, Christomonism or a kind of totalitarianism, towards the concept of the previousness of Jesus Christ, or a Jesus Christ-centred secular fellowship. The responses for these challenges are different exclusivist, inclusivist and pluralist theological models.⁶³ Parallel with these, dialogue people have started to rediscover and revitalise various ancient theories and theologies, like the one of the seeds of the word, or the theology of the pre-existent Logos.

In sum, if we consider the other religions to worship other “gods” or “goddesses” and thus refuse to take part in their prayer occasions, we are basically guilty of functional polytheism, since there is only one God.⁶⁴ Instead, if we really want to share our love and charity with other persons, we are challenged to evolve and develop a theology which can try to find places for the others’ narratives, in order to involve them as well in the mainstream of the salvation history God offers to all people on Earth.

61 ARIARAJAH S. Wesley tries to convince us about these categories in his article: ARIARAJAH S. Wesley, *Towards a Theology of Dialogue*. The Ecumenical Review, 1977/1. 4.

62 SONG Choan-Seng speaks about the plural and singular form in his article: SONG Choan-Seng, *The Power of God’s Grace in the World of Religions*. The Ecumenical Review 1987/1. 46.

63 SELVANAYAGAM Israel summarises these three responses to religious pluralism in SELVANAYAGAM Israel, *Christian Theology and Mission in the midst of many Theologies and Missions*. In *Theological Perspectives on other Faiths*. Lutheran World Federation Documentation 1997/41. 185–187.

64 The term *functional polytheism* is from ARIARAJAH S. Wesley, *No Other God*. In ARIARAJAH S. Wesley, *The Bible and People of other Faiths*. Genève, 1985. 10.

SÁRKÁNY Péter

An Outline of the Philosophical Care of the Soul: Phenomenology, Existential-Analytic Logotherapy and Philosophical Counselling

Beginning with ancient Greek philosophy, one of the most important characteristics of philosophical self-awareness is the parallel between body and soul, on the basis of which philosophers perceived philosophy as therapy of the soul. PLATO, for example, often compared the scientific and therapeutic ambitions of the philosopher to the activity of a medical doctor (see Gorgias 464a).

This connection was first brought to our attention by Werner JAEGER, who identified PLATO’s philosophy with the expression Therapie der Seele (Werner JAEGER. 1954. II. 32.), that is, cure of the soul, a kind of psychotherapy.

The philosophical tradition of cure of the soul, with all the peculiar ruptures of the Middle Ages and modernity, is still alive in XXth century philosophy; let us only think of the work of Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN, or the Czech philosopher Jan PATOČKA, who was also a disciple of Werner JAEGER.

Recent philosophy has put the subject again into the forefront of philosophical discourse, primarily due to the works of Pierre HADOT and Michel FOUCAULT; and, like any truly important mental achievements, this also searches for the meaning of philosophy.

Pierre HADOT in his publications draws our attention to the original practical nature of ancient Greek philosophy, as well as to the fact that

philosophical thinking was embodied in spiritual exercises (such as meditation, examination of one's consciousness, or the contemplation of nature), which aimed at the formation of the philosopher's soul and character.

In this sense, Pierre HADOT concludes, philosophy is actually an ascetic practice applied to our own selves, a lifestyle achieved by the act of thinking. A lifestyle which primarily aims at the love of wisdom, the three aspects of which are: peace of the soul (ataraxia), inner freedom (autarkeia) and cosmic consciousness (Pierre HADOT. 1991, 179.).

Undoubtedly, philosophy as a lifestyle has been achieved in various forms in the outstanding and methodologically self-conscious philosophies of the XXth century, even if all these are always sacrificed on the altar of scholarly philosophy, in accordance with the rites of academic philosophy.

I. Viewpoint and Purpose

Our purpose in this outline, in accordance with the title, is to investigate the mutual influence of philosophy and the self-referential subject dealing with philosophy, approached on the basis of an analysis of *phenomenological counselling*. Our basic intent is to outline the concept of the *phenomenological care of the soul*.

In a historical perspective, we rely on the ideas of classical German phenomenology (most of all on Edmund HUSSERL, Max SCHELER and Martin HEIDEGGER); and in connection with it, the results of applied phenomenological anthropology and psychology meant to *serve life*, also written in German (primarily the works of Viktor Emil FRANKL).

On the borderline of these two different perspectives, we ask the at the same time old and new questions connected to the phenomenological practice of care of the soul, which are in fact nothing else than the questioning of the phenomenological connections of philosophy cultivated as science and lifestyle:

What is the phenomenological relationship between scientific philosophy and one perceived as lifestyle, and what kind of existential wisdom does it imply? In other words: How can that self-evident parallel be achieved between scientific phenomenology and the improvement of human life that Edmund HUSSERL so often refers to?

In our paper,¹ all these questions serve as preparation for the development of a phenomenological concept and methodology of

care of the soul. The concrete investigations continuously refer to the works of phenomenologists and anthropologists. Of these, Viktor Emil FRANKL's logotherapy and existential analysis of phenomenological inspiration play an outstanding role, the interpretation of which serves a double purpose.

On the one hand, it emphasises the points of connection between *universal and personal phenomenological practice* by revealing the characteristics of "applied" phenomenology. On the other hand, it evaluates the philosophical aspects of FRANKL's works, treated by specialised philosophical and psychological literature only superficially.

Our argumentation attempts a simultaneous confutation of two versions of prejudice prevalent in academic circles. One side of this prejudice is represented by philosophers, especially phenomenologists: the psychologist and the psychotherapist deal exclusively with the real *I*; therefore their research is philosophically irrelevant.

The other side of the prejudice is usually represented by psychologists: according to them, philosophy is inadequate for revealing the problems of life; therefore, philosophers do not understand the challenges of life.

It is usually wrongly understood criticism towards the psychologism present in phenomenological philosophy which lies behind these prejudices. In reference to this, representatives of these two disciplines too hastily jump to conclusions, neglecting the historical context of the original discussion and the more recent results of the two fields.

Irvin D. YALOM, for example, offers great balance and clarifies several connections between psychotherapy and philosophy: he bases his argumentation against the prejudices mentioned on the practice of psychotherapy.

II. An Overview of our Line of Thought

Our line of thought can be divided into six points.

1. In the first point, we have a look at possible approaches to the notion of care of the soul. We identify the notion of care of the soul with simultaneous and mutually effective self-reference of philosophy and philosopher; and we emphasise one of its particular versions, the so-called *phenomenological practice*.
2. In the second point, we analyse classical formulations of the

¹ SÁRKÁNY Péter, *Filozófiai lélekgondozás: Fenomenológia – egzisztenciaanalitikus logoterápia – filozófiai praxis*. Budapest, 2008.

central element of phenomenological practice, *epokhé*, pointing to the particularities of Edmund HUSSERL's and Martin HEIDEGGER's philosophical concerns, which can be contained within a unitary concept as to care of the soul. We describe this unitary concept as the *care of thinking*.

3. Our third point moves on to the application of phenomenological philosophy, and mostly has a look at the philosophical issues of *phenomenological psychotherapy*. In this point our line of thought concerns the relationship of phenomenological and personal approaches.
4. In the following fourth point we examine Viktor Emil FRANKL's logotherapy and existential analysis, investigating how FRANKL's *medical ministry* is connected to anthropology and psychology taken in the sense of phenomenological philosophy. These investigations would primarily reveal the roots of existential analysis connected to Max SCHELER, but the comparative approach also sheds light on further aspects of FRANKL's phenomenology.
5. Resting on the results of previous points, the fifth point examines a widespread phenomenon of contemporary philosophical publicity, the so-called *philosophical counselling* (*philosophische Praxis*).
6. Finally, in the sixth point we outline the phenomenological idea and methodological possibilities of the *care of thinking*.

III. Important Results

1. Our first and most important aim is *outlining the unitary concept of phenomenological care of the soul*. We attempt to describe a notion of care of the soul capable of organically connecting phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychotherapy, concentrating on private life, sketching the relations of content and methodology of the two fields from this perspective.

Actually, in order to elaborate the notion of care of the soul, we needed a phenomenological basis from which the therapeutic ambitions of both scholarly endeavours could be derived, and which, if organically combined, could serve as the necessary foundation.

- A. According to our findings, this phenomenological basis is the *practice of the care of thought*, which in phenomenological philosophy and psychotherapy follows the ascetic ideas of classical philosophical tradition.

- B. The motivation of *the care of thought* in phenomenological philosophy based on the method of *epokhé* is the *will for theory*; and in phenomenological psychotherapy it is the *will of meaning*. In order to describe the unitary concept and methodology of care of the soul, it is necessary to combine these two seemingly divergent intentions.
- C. One of our important results is that the care of the soul, thematised on the basis of the idea of the care of thought, can be adequately described neither by classical phenomenological philosophy, nor by psychotherapeutical theory of a phenomenological descent; nor by the philosophical horizon of the relatively new discipline of philosophical counselling (*philosophische Praxis*).

The first disregards the personal practice of *epokhé*; the second disregards thinking beyond the dimension of privacy. The third, because of its non-phenomenological yet historical and sceptical perspective, only refers to the therapeutic references of philosophy from a historical perspective. It disregards systematic argumentation, with reference to a historical approach.

- D. The phenomenological practice of our interest rests, on the one hand, on motivation theory (will for meaning), methodology (modulation of approach and de-reflexion), and anthropological results of logotherapy and existential analysis, as one of the psychotherapies of a phenomenological inspiration, with reference to the Platonic therapeutic tradition of classical philosophy.
- E. On the other hand, however, it makes use of the motivational basis (will for theory and thinking) and methodology (*epokhé* and destruction) unfolding from *theoretical practice* (Edmund HUSSERL) and the connections of the *philosophy of care* (Martin HEIDEGGER) of phenomenological philosophy.
- E. From a systematic viewpoint, we make a distinction between two levels of phenomenological psychotherapy. One is *phenomenological logotherapy*, which achieves rupture from reality by the practice of the *care of thinking*. This is a value- and reason-oriented ascesis of life, which is methodologically the result of a de-reflexive modulation of approach.

Here we apply two Magyar (Hungarian) terms differing only in a single letter, both meaning *thinking*: *gondolkozás* and *gondolkodás*. In order to emphasise the difference in meaning with which we invest these two terms, in English we applied the terms *thinking* (for *gondolkozás*) and *thought* (for *gondolkodás*).

It is on this level that an actual phenomenological practice

can be built, termed the *care of thought*, which suspends *thinking* connected to the all-time approach. This is the thinking-oriented ascesis of life, which is the mutual result of the universal and personal *epokhé* present in phenomenological practice.

F. Care of the soul as intrapersonal and interpersonal practice can be outlined on the basis of Socratic dialogue and reduction. This kind of understanding of philosophy is capable of simultaneously validating the thought directed to the knowledge and improvement of the world.

2. Our other aim is only partly subordinated to the first one: it is a philosophical evaluation of Viktor Emil FRANKL's work. The results thereof have significantly influenced our standpoint on the phenomenological practice of care of the soul. In the following, we enlist the most important findings of our fourth mentioned point:

A. FRANKL's work is detailed from a philosophical point of view, primarily with regard to phenomenological connections. One of our basic statements is that the philosophical interpretation of logotherapy and existential analysis does not only fill a gap in the literature of philosophy, but at the same time sheds new light on existential philosophical thinking as a whole.

B. Logotherapy and existential analysis can primarily be connected to, and for the most part philosophically deduced from, Max SCHELER's anthropology and ethics, even if logotherapy and existential analysis as theory and practice of psychotherapy cannot be regarded merely as direct applications of Max SCHELER's philosophy.

C. In a phenomenological approach, several insights of FRANKL's work may serve as starting points for further analyses. Such are, for example, the questions of the meaning of life and the phenomenology of the experience of meaning in general, as well as the conception of the *intellectual dimension* outlined in the concept of responsibility. These insights have great significance for phenomenological anthropology and ethics.

D. The medical horizon of logotherapy and existential analysis is grounded in a concept of philosophy understood as existential philosophy. Thus, the *medical ministry* that FRANKL sets forth is actually based on a kind of *philosophical ministry*. In our understanding, therefore, logotherapy can be perceived and practiced as a kind of philosophical counselling.

The philosophical idea of care of the soul is very much alive in



phenomenological thinking. It represents, within the contemporary trends of philosophy and psychology, the previously mentioned therapeutic ambitions of philosophy, which date back to ancient Greek philosophy.

Its hallmarks are criticism towards the naturalism of the Platonic tradition, as well as affirmation of one's intellectual dimension. Our investigations offer a kind of philosophical cross-section of these issues, as well as a possible outline of the methodology of the *phenomenological care of the soul*.

Patricia BLOCKSOME

The Birth, Death and Resurrection of Theatre: Religion's Cyclical Relationship with the Stage

What is a wife and what is a harlot?
What is a church and what is a theatre?
Are they two and not one?
Can they exist separate?
Are not religion and politics the same thing?
Brotherhood is religion.
O demonstrations of reason
dividing families in cruelty and pride!¹

Religion and theatre, though currently separated, marked off through 'demonstrations of reason', share a multitude of similarities, and these similarities are more than coincidence. Yet, though the historically religious roots of several theatrical traditions are known, the theatre is and has been often attacked as an immoral influence by various religious majorities. The Sturm und Drang of complex and shifting relationships between the spiritual and the theatrical provides insight not only into the birth of theatre but also its death and resurrection.

¹ BLAKE William, *The Complete Poetry and Prose*. Berkeley, 1982. 207.